Murray First Thrift and Loan Co. v. Dwayne Stevenson and Carolyn Stevenson : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Murray First Thrift and Loan Co. v. Dwayne
Stevenson and Carolyn Stevenson : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stringham, Follett and Larsen; Steven Flint Lowe; Attorney for Defendants-Appellants.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy; Robert D. Merrill; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Murray First Thrift and Loan Co. v. Stevenson, No. 13820.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/978
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURTU Ec6 1975 
OF THE mQ'.im YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
STATE OF UTAtfe,,i,en Cla,k UmiM 
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & 
LOAN CO., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DWAYNE STEVENSON and 
CAROLYN STEVENSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
13820 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
HONORABLE HAL G. TAYLOR, JUDGE. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert D. Merrill 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
STRINGHAM, FOLLETT & LARSEN >T jj 
Steven Flint Lowe I I] 
808 East South Temple ! f N v 0 i3 7 S 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants ch.-i. ^ZZ>'c^Cui^h Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF T H E CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 2 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
POINT I. 
T H E SUBJECT ASSIGNMENT WAS 
AN ASSIGNMENT FOR SECURITY 
AND THEREFORE NOT IN DERO-
GATION OF T H E NON-ASSIGN-
ABILITY CLAUSE 4 
POINT I I . 
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES PROPER-
LY APPLY TO THE INSTANT MAT-
TER TO DEFEAT FORFEITURE 7 
POINT I I I . 
T H E LOWER COURT COMMITTED 
NO ERROR IN HOLDING T H E AS-
SIGNMENT CREATED A VALID SE-
CURITY INTEREST 11 
POINT IV. 
VIOLATION OF T H E NON-ASSIGN-
ABILITY CLAUSE DOES NOT EN-
TITLE STEVENSONS TO DECLARE 
A FORFEITURE 12 
CONCLUSION 14 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Badger Lumber Co. v. Parker, 85 Kan. 134, 116 
P. 242 (1911) 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum Co., 216 Cal. 
420, 14 P.2d 758 (1932) 5 
Coraci v. Noack, 61 Wis. 2d 183, 212 N.W.2d 
164 (1973) 9, 13 
Hull v. Hostettler, 224 Mich. 365, 194 N.W. 996 
(1932) 12 
Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 122 
Miss. 579, 84 So. 625 (1920) 6, 7 
Jankowski v. Jankowski, 31 Mich. 390,18 N.W.2d 
164 (1973) 9, 13 
Johnston v. Landucci, 21 Cal. 2d 63, 130 P.2d 405 
(1942) 6 
Lipsker v. Billings Boot Shop, 129 Mont. 420, 288 
P.2d 660 (1955) 6 
Thein v. Silver Investment Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 
308, 196 P.2d 956 (1948) 8 
Restatement of Property § 416 9, 13 
6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignment § 102 11 
55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser § 432 .... 10, 12, 13 
6 C.J.S. Assignments § 24(b) 5 
30 C.J.C. Equity § 56(b) 13 
S T A T U T E S C I T E D 
§ 70A-9-311, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & 
LOAN CO., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DWAYNE STEVENSON and 
CAROLYN STEVENSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff-Re-
spondent, Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. (herein-
after "Murray") a g a i n s t Defendant-Appellants 
Dwayne Stevenson and Carolyn Stevenson, (herein-
after jointly "Stevensons"), whereby Murray sought a 
judgment declaring that Murray held a valid security 
interest in certain real property pursuant to the terms 
of an Assignment of Contract dated September 25, 
1973, and executed by Jerry W. Cooper and Candy 
Cooper (hereinafter jointly "Coopers"), in favor of 
Case No. 
13820 
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Murray. Stevensons denied that Murray held any in-
terest in said real property and counterclaimed to have 
title quieted in themselves. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
Murray and Stevensons each filed Motions for j 
Summary Judgment based upon the pleadings, affi-
davits and Memorandums of Points and Authorities 
on file with the lower court. The lower court entered 
its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment which recognized the validity of Murray's 
security interest and provided that Stevensons had a 
right to pay Murray $7,188.77 within 30 days or pay 
said sum over the repayment term of the promissory 
note executed by Coopers, and upon compliance with 
such terms, Murray would release said security interest. 
The Judgment further provided that if Stevensons 
failed to comply with said terms, the Motion of Murray 
for Summary Judgment would be granted. The lower 
court did not enter a Judgment against Stevensons for 
the sum of $7,188.77 as asserted by Stevensons in their 
Brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Murray seeks affirmance of the Judgment entered 
by the lower court. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The Statement of Facts contained in the Brief of 
Stevensons is essentially accurate, except for some un-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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warranted conclusions and except for some assertions 
of facts which were not determined by the lower court. 
The material facts, as determined by the lower court 
are hereinafter set forth. 
On or about September 24, 1973, Coopers duly 
executed and delivered to Murray a renewal promissory 
note, whereby they agreed and became obligated to pay 
Murray the principal sum of $7,188.77, together with 
interest thereon over a term as provided in said note. 
To secure the payment of this indebtedness, Coopers 
assigned to Murray, pursuant to the terms of that cer-
tain Assignment of Contract (hereinafter the "Assign-
ment"), dated September 25, 1973, all of the right, title 
and interest of Coopers, as buyers, under the terms of 
a certain Uniform Real Estate Contract (hereinafter 
the "Contract"), dated August 29, 1967, entered into 
by and between Stevensons, as sellers, and Coopers, as 
buyers, covering certain real property owned by Steven-
sons, situated in Salt Lake County, Utah (hereinafter 
the "Subject Property"). The Assignment was duly 
recorded on September 28, 1973, in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder. 
The Coopers failed to pay any of the sums which 
had become due and owing under said note. On Novem-
ber 20, 1973, Jerry W. Cooper filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy with the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, and on that day he was duly adjudi-
cated a bankrupt. Thereafter, at the first meeting of 
creditors on December 11, 1973, the Bankruptcy Court, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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at the request of the parties herein, and pursuant to the 
application of Trustee, disclaimed any interest in and 
to the Subject Property. 
Stevensons were unaware of the Assignment by 
Coopers to Murray until said first meeting of creditors. 
Murray, at that time, tendered to Stevensons full pay-
ment and performance of the obligations of the Coopers 
under the Contract. Stevensons refused said tender and 
denied that Murray had any right in the Subject Prop-
erty by reason of said Assignment. 
Stevensons refused said tender and denied the in-
terest of Murray on the basis that Coopers had failed 
to comply with a sentence, in the body of the paragraph 
of the contract which set for the payment schedule, and 
which stated: 
The buyers agree that they cannot assign, sell 
or transfer their initere&t in this Contract without 
specific written permission of sellers. . . . 
Stevensons thereafter entered into an agreement di-
rectly with the Coopers whereby the Coopers attempted 
to abandon their interest in the Subject Property. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE SUBJECT ASSIGNMENT WAS AN 
ASSIGNMENT FOR S E C U R I T Y AND 
THEREFORE NOT IN DEROGATION OF 
THE NON-ASSIGNABILITY CLAUSE. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Tlic essential argument made by Stevensons in 
Points 1 and i i ,.•: ;:k.i Brief is that the non-assign-
ability clause contained in the Contract is legally suf-
ficient to vitiate any assignment, with respect to the in-
terest of Stevensons, including the assignment from 
Coopers u* Murray. 
As noted above. Coopers assigned their interest in 
the Contract to Murray for the purpose of securing 
payment of an obligation owing from Coopers. Coopers 
w a r to iviiuii possession of the Subject Proper ty and 
were obligated to keep the Contract current and in full 
force and effect. 
C - a 11* i I;;;*-* i raditionally interpreted non-assign-
ability clauses strictly because of the infringement on 
the right of alienation of property, and courts have 
held that assignments for purposes of securing an obli-
gation are not in derogation of a such a clause. In 6 
C.J .S . Assignments § 24(b) it is noted: 
As the right of alienation, however, is an incident 
of property, the right to make an assignment 
can be defeated only by a clear stipulation to 
that effect. Further, stipulations against assign-
ment have been held not intended to prevent 
assignment as collateral, [emphasis added] 
I n the case of I 'iht/ji/ntn , . t *-
 (VM H'csii s n irt/psum 
Co., 216 Cal. 420, 14 P.2d 7,)h \i\)'^), the Court was 
considering a MOM-assignability clause contained in a 
laese and option «.» purchase. The ( lo\ i r t n o t e d : 
I i bat \.\ i. '.v;- • "il ion o* aiilhiMii)' tn th»' piui 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
ciple that covenants limiting the free alienation 
of property such as covenants against assign-
ment are barely tolerated and must be strictly 
construed. . . . [citations omitted]. These cases 
and many others that might be cited establish 
the rule that it is only a technical assignment 
that is prohibited by such covenant. A mortgage 
of the lease [in the instant case], of course, 
does not constitute a technical assignment. . . . 
[A] covenant against assignment is not violated 
by the giving of a mortgage [citations omitted]. 
14 P.2d at 760-761. Also see, Lipsker v. Billings Boot 
Shop, 129 Mont. 420, 288 P.2d 660 (1955); Johnston 
v. Landucci, 21 Cal. 2d 63, 130 P.2d 405 (1942); 
Badger Lumber Co. Parker, 85 Kan. 134, 116 P . 242 
(1911). 
In the case of Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Hum-
phrey, 122 Miss. 579, 84 So. 625 (1919), the Court 
noted that the assignment in that case was clearly for 
purposes of securing payment on a note and that the 
assignee did not become the real and unconditional 
owner, but that the assig'nor retained the legal owner-
ship. The Court held the assignment valid, notwith-
standing a non-assignability clause, and noted: 
[W]e find the text book rule to be that stipula-
tions against assignments are not intended to 
prevent assignment as collateral. This seems to 
be an announcement of the general rule, which 
we have found applied in many cases involving 
land contracts, insurance policies, etc. . . . 
84 So. at 626. 
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I t is noted that in the cases of Inter-Southern Life 
Ins. Co. and Lipsker, supra, the Courts adopted as law 
provisions similar to section 70A-9-311, Utah Uniform 
Commerial Code, which provides: 
The debtor's rights in collaterial may be volun-
tarily or involuntarily transferred (by way of 
sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, 
levy, garnishment or other judicial process) 
notwithstanding a provision in the security 
agreement prohibiting any transfer or making 
the transfer constitute a default. 
In the instant matter, Coopers assigned their in-
terest under the Contract solely for the purpose of se-
curing performance of an obligation in favor of Murray. 
Murray acquired no immediate right to possession of 
anything but an equity interest in the Subject Proper-
ty. Therefore, pursuant to the above cited authority, 
the assignment from Coopers to Murray was not vio-
lative of the non-assignability clause contained in the 
Contract. 
POINT II. 
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES PROPERLY AP-
PLY TO THE INSTANT MATTER TO DE-
FEAT FORFEITURE. 
In Point I I I of the Brief of Sevensons, it is ar-
gued that the lower court erred in granting the relief 
framed in the Judgment, which, Stevensons argue, was 
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equitable in nature, i.e. specific performance, because 
the assignment violated the non-assignability clause. 
Stevensons assert equity will not assist a party who is 
the sole cause of his own damage. The conclusion of 
Stevensons is based solely on the case of Thein v. Silver 
Investment Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 308, 196 P.2d 956 
(1948). From the facts and conclusions of law of the 
Thein case which were recited by Stevensons in their 
Brief, it appears that the Court held that an assignee 
of a contract cannot avail himself to equitable principles 
against the obligor of the original contract when the 
contract contained a non-assignability clause. This con-
clusion from the case as asserted by Stevensons is un-
equivocally erroneous. 
The Court in the Thein case denied the application 
of equitable principles, not because an assignment vio-
lated a non-assignability clause, but because Mr. Thein 
had failed to discharge obligations incurred after the 
assignment. The Court noted that the controlling fac-
tor in the case was that Thein had no interest in the 
property anyway because of the default under the orig-
inal sales contract and the reentry by Silver and that 
Thein had not tendered payment until after said de-
fault and reentry. 
Therefore, the case law upon which Stevensons 
rely to argue Point I I I is not supportive of the con-
clusions asserted, i.e. violation of a non-assignability 
clause defeats application of equity. Furthermore, the 
attempted assertion is contrary to established principles 
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of equity. In the Official Comments to the RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY § 416, which deals with non-assign-
ability clauses, it is stated: 
As restraints dealt with in this section, whether 
promissory or forfeiture in form, are primarily 
security devices designed to make more certain 
the payment of the purchase price, their at-
tempted enforcement by the vendor may, under 
certain circumstances, be avoided by the various 
equitable doctrines. 
The Comments further state, in direct contradiction of 
what Stevensons argue: 
The assignee may come in and demand specific 
performance of the contract of sale, having made 
tender of full performance prior to the action.... 
I t is noted that Murray did in fact tender full per-
formance to Stevensons of the obligations of Coopers. 
(See Paragraph 8 of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law.) 
Consistent with the above cited Comments to the 
Restatement of Property, is the holding in the case of 
Jankowski v. Jankowski, 311 Mich. 340, 18 N.W.2d 
848 (1945), wherein the Court held that where the ven-
dor had been offered the entire balance owing under a 
contract which had been assigned in violation of a non-
assignability clause, a Court will not permit forfeiture. 
In the case of Covad v. Noack, 61 Wis.2d 183, 212 
N.W.2d 164 (1973), the Court stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The nonassignability provision in the land con-
tract is for the benefit of the vendor to safeguard 
performance and if performance is tendered the 
restriction becomes moot and of no consequence. 
To permit enforcement of the non-assignability 
provision at this juncture would serve no pur-
pose save for the imposition of a forfeiture upon 
the assignee. A court of equity will not permit 
such a result. . . . Thus, the courts have ruled 
that an assignee of the purchaser of a land con-
tract may commence an action in strict per-
formance under said land contract upon the 
tendering of the principal and interest due under 
said contract despite the presence of a non-as-
signment clause in the land contract. 
212 N.W.2d at 167. 
I t is noted in 55 A M . J U R . VENDOR AND P U R -
CHASER § 432: 
[AJccording to the weight of authority, where a 
provision against the assignabiMty of a contract 
for the sale of land is not followed by any pro-
vision for the forfeiture of the contract, the as-
signment thereof does not operate to forfeit the 
contract or confer an excuse for the vendor's 
refusal to carry it out, if the obligations of the 
vendee under the oontmct are due and have been 
fully performed or duly tendered by him or the 
assignee. In this respect, the view has been taken 
that the assignment is enforceable in equity, not-
withstanding the restriction against assignment, 
where it appears that the restriction was in the 
nature of a mere security for the performance 
of the principal covenants, and where such en-
forcement appears equitable under the circum-
stances of the case. 
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Since Murray did in fact tender full performance, 
the lower Court properly would not permit Stevensons 
to declare a forfeiture. Any damage or inconvenience 
which may have been or may hereafter be incurred by 
Stevensons is a direct result of their refusal to accept 
the tender by Murray. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO 
ERROR IN HOLDING THE ASSIGNMENT 
CREATED A V A L I D SECURITY IN-
TEREST. 
Stevensons argue in Point IV of their Brief that 
the Assignment cannot create a security lien in the in-
terest in the Subject Property held by Stevensons. 
However, neither the Assignment nor the Judg-
ment entered below creates any right in Murray to any 
interest of Stevensons. Murray only obtained the rights 
and interest of Coopers by the Assignment, and Mur-
ray only obtains such rights as a matter of law. In 6 
A M . JUK. 2d Assignments § 102 it is stated that the 
assignee only acquires the rights and interests of the as-
signor and such rights and interests are subject to any 
setoff, claim or defense of the obligor. 
Thus, the argument of Stevensons that Murray 
could not acquire an interest in the rights of Stevensons 
is clearly correct. However, all Murray acquired by 
the assignment was a security interest in the equity and 
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rights of Coopers and the Judgment of the lower court 
only effects the interests of the Coopers. The Judgment 
and Assignment do not effect any right, title or interest 
of Stevensons. 
POINT IV. 
VIOLATION OF THE NONASSIGNABIL-
ITY CLAUSE DOES NOT ENTITLE STEV-
ENSONS TO DECLARE A FORFEITURE. 
In the instant matter, there are two principles 
which exist which would defeat the attempt by Steven-
sons to declare a forfeiture of the Contract and quiet 
title in themselves. The first principle is that when a 
non-assignability clause is not followed by a clear and 
specific forfeiture provision, the vender may not declare 
a forfeiture for a violation of such a clause. See general' 
ly, 55 A M . Jur. Vendor and Purchaser § 432. In Hull 
v. Hostettler, 224 Mich. 365, 194 N.W. 996 (1923), 
Court stated that the vendor was not entitled to declare 
forfeiture where the non-assignability clause did not 
specifically provide that an assignment would consti-
tute a default. 
With respect to the Contract between Coopers and 
Stevensons, there is no specific reference to the rights 
of Stevensons if Coopers should assign their interest. 
I t is submitted that in keeping with judicial policy of 
strictly construing non-assignability clauses, the non-
assignability clause in the Contract must be construed 
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as insufficient to warrant forfeiture in the event of as-
signment. Therefore, the remedy of Stevensons is to 
recover damages, if any, from Coopers. See, 30 C.J.S. 
Equity § 56(b). 
A second principle which would defeat Stevensons 
obtaining the relief sought is that equity will not now 
permit Stevensons to declare a forfeiture after they 
have received a tender of the full performance of the 
Contract. As noted above, notwithstanding the violation 
of a non-assignability clause, once tender to the vendor 
of all obligations of the purchaser is made, equity will 
not permit the vendor to thereafter declare a forfeiture. 
See supra, Coraci v. Noack, 61 Wis.2d 183, 212 N.W.2d 
164 (1973); Jankowski v. Jankowski, 311 Mich. 340, 
18 N.W.2d 848 (1945); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 
416, Comment e; 55 A M . JUR. Vendor and Purchaser 
§ 432. 
Since not permitting a vendor to declare a forfei-
ture in this matter is essentially equitable, it is interest-
ing to note that the Subject Property was sold to 
Coopers for $19,500.0, but was appraised as of Novem-
ber 4, 1973, at $24,000.00, and no doubt has continued 
to appreciate. Consequently, there should be sufficient 
value to the Subject Property to satisfy both the in-
terests of Murray and Stevensons. To allow Stevensons 
to recover the total equity of Coopers amounts to a 
windfall, which Stevensons have not earned or for which 
they have given any consideration, and to permit such 
to occur would clearly prejudice Murray. 
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CONCLUSION 
The relief granted by the lower court was proper 
in all respects, if not overly generous to Stevensons. 
The Court properly determined that Murray held a 
valid security interest in the equity and rights of 
Coopers and that the obtaining of such security interest 
was not in derogation of the non-assignability clause. 
Furthermore, principles of equity would not permit 
Stevensons to declare a forfeiture, even if there were 
a violation of the non-assignability clause, because a 
forfeiture would be a windfall to Stevensons, the non-
assignability clause is not followed by a forfeiture pro-
vision and because Murray made timely tender to Stev-
ensons in full satisfaction of all obligations of Coopers. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert D. Merrill 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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